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Note: Informing the Jury of the Effect of Its Answers
to Special Verdict Questions - The Minnesota Experience
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 5, 1973, the Minnesota Supreme Court amended
Rule 49.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to require
instruction and permit argument to the jury on the legal effect
of its answers to special verdict questions in comparative
negligence cases.' The amendment reversed the long standing
position that any such instruction or argument constitutes
error.2 Minnesota is the only jurisdiction which now permits
the jury to be informed in this manner. The amendment poses
significant questions regarding the proper role of the special ver-
dict in civil jury trials and the proper role of the supreme court
in making procedural rules for trial courts. This Note will ex-
amine these questions through an analysis of: (1) the special
verdict; (2) the changes in special verdict procedure brought
about by the supreme court's amendment; and (3) the impact
of these changes.
11. THE SPECIAL VERDICT
In a special verdict,3 the jury answers questions on issues
of fact (e.g., Was plaintiff negligent? Were defendants engaged
in a joint venture? Was X the agent of Y?). The judge then
applies the appropriate law to the jury's answers and arrives
at the result.4 In this way, special verdicts differ from general
1. For the complete text of Rule 49.01 as amended, see text ac-
companying note 76 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 59-71 infra.
3. This note will deal exclusively with special verdicts in civil
cases as authorized by M . R. Civ. P. 49.01 (and FED. T Cirv. P. 49(a)). It will not deal with special verdicts in criminal cases. Although
special verdicts have been used in criminal cases, their use is disfavored
as "against the policy of the law." People v. Tessmer, 171 Mich. 522,
529, 137 N.W. 214, 217 (1912). See also State v. Boggs, 87 W. Va. 738,
106 S.E. 47 (1921); G. CLEmNToN, SPECiAL VmicTs AN SPECXAL FIuN-
INGS BY JuuxEs 289-96 (1905) [hereinafter cited as CLEMENTSON]. It
also will not deal with general verdicts accompanied by interrogatories
as authorized by Mn. R. Civ. P. 49.02 (and FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b)).
For a sample set of special verdict questions and explanation of their
effect, see Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICn. L. Rlv. 465, 497-
99 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
4. J. FRAx, CouRTs ON TRIAL 141 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
FAx]. For other definitions of the special verdict, see Insurance Coin-
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verdicts in which the jury arrives at the result by returning
a verdict for plaintiff or defendant. The special verdict origi-
nated as a device by which English juries avoided having their
verdicts attaintedO but has been transformed in the American
courtroom into a method of judicial control of the jury.7 By
using a special verdict, a trial judge can require the jury to
decide only the facts while reserving to himself the function
of applying the law to the facts.
The statutory authority for the use of special verdicts was
firmly established in the United States in the first quarter of
the twentieth century." At present one of two approaches to
the use of the special verdict is generally adopted. The first
approach permits the trial court to order a special verdict.0 The
pany v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378, 387 (1872); Mumford v. Ward-
well, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 432-33 (1867); Suydam v. Williamson, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 427, 432 (1857); CLEMENTSON, supra note 3, at 44-46.
For Minnesota definitions, see Roske v. Ilykanyics, 232 Minn. 383, 391-
92, 45 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1951); Ferch v. Hiller, 209 Minn. 124, 127,
295 N.W. 504, 506 (1941).
5. See sources cited in note 4 supra; Glenn v. Sumner, 132 U.S.
152, 156 (1889).
6. English jury verdicts were originally subject to a procedure
called "attaint," by which the jurors could be fined or imprisoned if their
verdict was declared invalid on factual or legal grounds. CLEMENTSON,
supra note 3, at 203. Histories of the special verdict include CLEMENT-
SON, supra note 3, and Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and
Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575 (1923).
7. L. GREEN, JuDGE AN JURY 353 (1930). See also CLEMENTSON,
supra note 3, at 8; F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 293-94 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as JAMES]; J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 217-19
(1898); Note, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 483, 486-87 (1965).
8. CLEMENTSON, supra note 3, at 9; Note, Special Verdicts, supra
note 7, at 487. See also Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil
Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 296, 297-98 (1926).
9. This approach is followed by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Rule 49(a) provides:
(a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return
only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding
upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit
to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other
brief answer or may submit written forms of the several spe-
cial findings which might properly be made under the plead-
ings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submit-
ting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as
it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury
such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its
findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each
party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted
unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the
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second approach 'also permits either the plaintiff or the defend-
ant to require a special verdict.10
A. VIEWs OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT
The special verdict limits the jury to factfinding and leaves
to the judge the task of determining the law and applying it
to the facts. Different views of the special verdict reflect dif-
ferent assumptions about how well juries can find facts and
determine and apply law. These assumptions have resulted in
three general views of the special verdict. The first view sees
the special verdict as a necessary check on jury prejudice and
ignorance of the law. The second sees it as an undesirable bar-
rier to the jury's right to temper the law to individual cases.
The third sees it as a helpful aid to jury factfinding and trial
administration.
Each of these views has some merit in describing the nature
of civil jury performance.1 However, since jury deliberations
are secret, a commentator can have at best a very imperfect
knowledge of how juries function.12 The Chicago Jury Project,
which attempted to study the jury scientifically, dealt primarily
with the criminal jury.13 As to the civil jury, the Chicago study
revealed no significant difference between jury verdicts and ju-
dicial findings in civil cases.14 This raises the possibility that
jury. -As to an issue omitted without such demand the court
may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed
to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the
special verdict.
The Federal Rules also provide for a general verdict to be accompanied
by special interrogatories as a check on the jury. See FED. R. C'v. P.
49 (b).
10. The second approach is followed by some states. For example,
the Minnesota comparative negligence statute, Mn;N. STAT. § 604.01 (1)
(1971) provides, in part:
The court may, and when requested by either party shall, direct
the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the
amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributa-
ble to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount
of such damages in proportion to the amount of negligence at-
tributable to the person recovering.
See also CLEw osNo, supra note 3, at 297-320.
11. See Broeder, The Functions of The Jury: Fact or Fictions?
21 U. Cm L. Rnv. 386 (1953); James, Functions of Judge and Jury in
Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949).
12. Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA L. Rzv. 1055
(1964); see also Sunderland, Trial by Jury, 11 U. Cnw. L. REv. 120,
121 (1937).
13. See H. KALVEN & IL ZEisEr, THE AznxcUx JURy (1966).
14. ,Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L.
REV. 744, 750 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Broeder].
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much of the judge versus jury debate is irrelevant.15 In any
event, each of the three views will be examined further to deter-
mine whether informing the jury of the effect of its answers
is consistent with the perceived roles of the special verdict.
1. The Special Verdict as a Necessary Check on Jury Prejudice
and Legal Ignorance
It has been said that:
Experience teaches that not every case is decided on the evi-
dence. Prejudice may be a thirteenth juror that controls the
decision. 16
The desire to expel this thirteenth juror led to a vigorous attack
upon the American jury system. The late Judge Jerome Frank
was one of the most distinguished leaders of this attack. He
argued that jury sympathy and prejudice, encouraged by law-
yers' stage tears and dramatic performances, played a major role
in civil jury trial decisions. 17 He also acknowledged that jurors
often disregard the judge's instructions on the law. In his opin-
ion, this made the law as variable as the passions and prejudices
of men.'8 He called the juries "ad hoc ephemeral (un-elected)
legislatures" which make law from the jury box. 9 Judge Frank
argued that the problem was further compounded by the fact that
the jury often did not understand the judge's instructions. 20 He
was joined in this by Sunderland who commented that twelve
men could "misunderstand more law in a minute than the judge
[could] explain in an hour."'2 ' Sunderland questioned whether
twelve such legally ignorant persons should have the power to
formulate and apply the law in an individual case.22  Judge
Frank went so far as to hint that the civil jury should be abol-
ished but concluded that constitutional considerations precluded
this.-23
15. See also Sunderland, Trial by Jury, 11 U. CINN. L. REv. 120,
123-25 (1937).
16. A. OsBoRN, TH MIND OF THE JUROR 92 (1937).
17. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 61-62 (2d Cir.
1948) (opinion of Frank, J.).
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id. at 58-59.
20. Id. at 64-65.
21. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253,
259 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Sunderland].
22. Id.
23. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 56-57 (2d Cir.
1948). The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed $20, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
[Vol. 58:903
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Judge Frank, Sunderland and other commentators focused
their attack on the general verdict. They argued that a simple
finding "for defendant" or "for plaintiff" allows a jury to hide
the prejudices and misapplications of law that produced it -4
Sunderland called the general verdict "as inscrutable and essen-
tially mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient
oracle of Delphi."215  Under its guise, the jury could misunder-
stand the judge's instructions or flagrantly disregard them and
no one would be the wiser.26
As a remedy for the claimed weaknesses of the general ver-
dict, the commentators urged the use of the special verdict.
Judge Frank argued:
A special verdict would seem to do away with some of the most
objectionable features of trial by jury. The division of func-
tions between jury and judge is apparently assured, the one
attending to the facts alone, the other to the legal rules alone.
The jury seems, by this device, to be shorn of its power to
ignore the rules or to make rules to suit itself. As one court
said, special verdicts "dispel ... the darkness visible of general
verdicts." 27
The criticisms by Judge Frank and other opponents of the civil
jury reveal the special verdict as a device which confines the
jury to factfinding and eliminates the less judicially controllable
function of applying the law to the facts. This view of the
special verdict has been aptly summarized in the commentary
of Judge Gunnar Nordbye of the United States District Court
for Minnesota:
It is quite apparent, therefore, that the whole thought behind
the special verdict practice is to free the jury from any pro-
cedure which would inject the feeling of partisanship in their
minds and limit their deliberations to the specific fact questions
submitted. Furthermore, the jury will be relieved of the often
difficult task of endeavoring to apply involved principles of law
to the issues of fact, which must be done in the event a general
verdict is called for.28
The critics of the civil jury place much reliance on the ex-
istence of jury prejudice, but their use of the term embraces
two quite distinct meanings: prejudice for or against a particu-
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
24. Sunderland, supra note 21, at 257-60. Skidmore v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 57 (2d Cir. 1948).
25. Sunderland, supra note 21, at 258.
26. Id.
27. J. FRAK, CouRTs oN TRrAL 141 (1949).
28. Nordbye, Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minne-
sota Rules, 36 MrmN. L. RLv. 672, 683 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
Nordbye].
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lar individual or class of individuals, and agreement or disagree-
ment with prevailing legal rules. Prejudice for or against par-
ties is difficult if not impossible to eradicate by use of a special
verdict which can do no more than force the jury to consider
specific factual questions. Prejudice against legal rules can in
theory be eliminated by the use of a special verdict as the jury
will not apply the law to its findings of fact.20
2. The Special Verdict as an Undesirable Barrier to Jury Cor-
rection of the Law in Individual Cases
The jury is the "great corrective of the law in its actual
administration.," 30 The second view holds that the jury should
apply the law to the facts in order to advance the law in accord
with popular conceptions of justice. It follows the same basic
factual assumption as the first view-that jurors will on occasion
disregard instructions and follow their own feelings. The con-
trast arises from the fact that the second view perceives this "jury
legislation" to be a desirable result. This view, too, has drawn
much distinguished support. Justice Holmes argued that the
jury's "popular prejudice keeps the law in accord with the
wishes of the community."'31 Similarly, Judge Wyzanski has ar-
gued that the jury can serve as a partial cure for legislative
and judicial inertia in areas of needed reform. In his words,
the jury acts as a "device by which the rigor of the law is modi-
fied pending the enactment of new statutes."3 2
An often-quoted example of this jury function is the way
in which some juries have dealt with contributory negligence.3
The doctrine of contributory negligence bars all recovery to a
plaintiff who is even slightly negligent. Some juries, thinking
complete denial of compensation to be unfair, have ignored the
court's instructions and found in favor of contributorily negli-
gent plaintiffs. Some of these juries also reduced the damage
awards of negligent plaintiffs.3 4 Legislatures in several juris-
29. But see text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
30. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. Rgv. 12,
18 (1910). See also JAMES, supra note 7, at 297.
31. 0. HOLMES, COLLEcTED LFArL PAPE s 237-38 (1920).
32. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65
HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1952).
33. See, e.g., Haeg v. Sprague, Warner and Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429-
30, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938). See also Prosser, supra note 3, at 469.
However, the Chicago Jury Project disagrees. See Broeder, supra note
14, at 750.
34. See sources cited in note 33 supra.
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dictions finally codified this result in comparative negligence
statutes.35 Thus, the jury's "popular prejudice" favoring com-
pensation produced fairer results in individual cases before re-
medial legislation was enacted.
It is logical that strong advocates of the jury system tend
to oppose the use of special verdicts. The special verdict re-
moves from the jury the function of applying the law to the
facts. Therefore, to the extent that the special verdict is suc-
cessful, it is a barrier to the corrective role of the jury. This
argument can even be extended to constitutional dimensions.
Justices Black and Douglas suggested that the use of a special
verdict violates the right to jury trial as secured by the seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution.80  Consequently,
they maintained that special verdicts should be abolished in the
federal courts since only the general verdict preserves the "right
of trial by jury as an indispensable part of a free government."3 7
3. The Special Verdict as a Helpful Aid to Jury Factfinding
and Trial Administration
It is generally conceded "[t]hat we have not been particu-
larly successful in endeavoring to adapt the jury system to the
many complex fact issues arising in modern litigation . . .,,"
The third view holds that although the jury is basically a sound
institution, it needs the guidance of the special verdict because
of the complexity of the law. Hetland and Adamson, the au-
thors of Minnesota Practice, are typical of the proponents of
this view. They contend that freedom from jury prejudice is
only one of many purposes of the special verdict. 0 The pur-
poses they note as most significant are: (1) compliance with
comparative negligence statutes which require separate findings
of negligence and damages to apportion recovery; and (2) simpli-
fication of complicated cases by posing questions in a logical or-
der to assist juries in resolving the issues.40
35. See Prosser, supra note 3. See also Mnw. STAT. § 604.01(1)
(1971).
36. Statement of Justices Black and Douglas regarding the promul-
gation of Rules of Civil Procedure, at 374 U.S. 865, 867-68 (1963). See
also note 23 supra.
37. Id. at 868.
38. Nordbye, Use of Special Verdicts Under Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 2 F.R.D. 138 (1943).
39. 2 J. HIETAxD & 0. AnmsVsoN, MINEsoTA PRACTICE 291 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as HETLAND & ADAmSoN].
40. Id. See also Prosser, supra note 3, at 503-05, 520.
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A modern automobile case tried under Minnesota's Safety
Responsibility 4' and Comparative Negligence4 2 statutes provides
an example of Hetland and Adamson's analysis. Assume a colli-
sion between a car owned by plaintiff A and driven by plaintiff
B, and a car owned by defendant C and driven by defendant
D. Each plaintiff sues each defendant. Defendant C counter-
claims against both plaintiffs for damage to his automobile. De-
fendant D counterclaims against the plaintiffs for personal in-
juries. Defendant C cross-claims against defendant D for indem-
nity from any judgment entered against him. Under the Safety
Responsibility Act, each driver's negligence is imputed to the
car's owner if the car was being driven with the owner's con-
sent.4 3 However, in the suits by the owners to recover for dam-
age to their cars, the negligence of their drivers is not imputed
to them.4 4 Under the Comparative Negligence Act, the jury is
required to compare the causal negligence of plaintiffs and de-
fendants in percentages. If this case were given to a jury with-
out a special verdict and with a complete set of instructions as
to the law, the jury would undoubtedly be confused. A special
verdict avoids much of this confusion by asking separate special
questions on each issue involved. Thus, the jury can be guided
through the multi-issue, multi-party maze to more accurate fact-
finding.
Other commentators have suggested two administrative ad-
vantages of the special verdict. First, special verdicts localize
error.4 5 An error in instructing the jury on a general verdict
generally requires a new trial. If a special verdict is used, how-
ever, the error can often be traced to one of the answers. If
that answer is not prejudicial to the party asserting error, a
new trial is not necessary. Second, special verdicts avoid long
and complex general instructions. 46 When a general verdict is
used, the jury must be instructed on all the law necessary to
reach their result. When a special verdict is used, the jury need
41. MiNN. STAT. § 170.54 (1971).
42. IVNlq. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1971).
43. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1971) provides:
Whenever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state,
by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the
owner express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of
accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehi-
cle in the operation thereof.
See also Schultz v. Swift & Co., 210 Minn. 533, 299 N.W. 7 (1941).
44. Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 65 N.W.2d 917 (1954).
45. See JAMES, supra note 7, at 295-96.
46. Id. at 296-97.
[Vol. 58:903
SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS
only be instructed on whatever law is necessary to enable them
to answer the questions,47 and instructions on burden of proof
and complex rules of law can often be omitted.
4 8
B. IMPACT OF VIEws REGARDING SPECIAL VERDICTS ON THE DECISION
TO INFORIm THE JURY OF THE EFFECT OF ITS ANSWERS TO SPECIAL
VERDICT QUESTIONS
The three views of the special verdict discussed above imply
different solutions to the problem of determining what informa-
tion the jury should have about its special verdict. The first
view sees the special verdict as a check on jury prejudice and
ignorance of the law. Under this view, any information about
the effect of the jury's answers would destroy the purpose of
a special verdict since it would return to the jury the power
to ignore instructions and manipulate the answers. Because ad-
herents of the second view see the special verdict as an unde-
sirable barrier to jury correction of the law in individual cases,
they would probably not use the special verdict at all. However,
if the special verdict were to be used, they would argue that the
jury should be given complete information on the effect of its
verdict since the jury must know the legal result in order to
evaluate and correct it. The third view sees the special verdict
as a helpful aid to jury factfinding and trial administration.
This view does not necessarily preclude informing the jury
of the effect of its answers unless that information would con-
fuse the jury or provide a greater source of error.
1. The Prevailing Rule: No Information
Both federal and state courts have generally adopted the
first view of the special verdict, holding that for the court to
inform the jury of the effect of its answers is prejudicial error
requiring a new trial.4 9  The courts have been inconsistent in
47. M1m . R. Civ. P. 49.01 (FED. RuLE Civ. P. 49(a)). See note
89 infra. See also JAlvixs, supra note 7, at 296-97.
48. Nordbye, supra note 28, at 683.
49. See, e.g., Argo v. Blackshear, 242 Ark. 817, 416 S.W.2d 314
(1967); Kennard v. Housing Associates, Inc., 209 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct.
1961); Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn. 534, 354 S.W.
2d 464 (1962); Besnah v. City of Fond du Lac, 35 Wis. 2d 755, 151 N.W.
2d 725 (1967). The attitude of the Wisconsin courts is typical:
The sole purpose of a special verdict is to get the jury to an-
swer each question according to the evidence, regardless of the
effect or supposed effect of the answer upon the rights of the
parties as to recovery. To inform them of the effect of their
answer in this respect is to frustrate this purpose.
1974]
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their determination of what arguments counsel can properly
make to the jury. Clearly, reversible error is committed if coun-
sel indicates to the jury the effect of its answers.50 However,
some states allow counsel to argue for individual favorable an-
swers.5 1 Thus, counsel can argue to the jury that it should
answer question number one "yes," question number two "no,"
and so on. Some states have also held that a court's corrective
instruction can make counsel's error nonprejudicial.52  Finally,
some jurisdictions have produced numerous opinions drawing
fine distinctions concerning which arguments do and do not im-
ply the effect of an answer.5 3
2. Criticisms of the Prevailing Rule
The rule that information on the effect of the answers must
be withheld from the jury is subject to several basic criticisms.
First, there is no substantial evidence that juries exhibit harmful
prejudices in making decisions. To the contrary, evidence that
is available suggests that juries often agree with judges in their
decisions.54  In addition, it must be admitted that judges also
have their prejudices. While juror's prejudices last no longer
than a single case and can be corrected by group deliberations,
the prejudices of an individual judge can affect the results of
cases arising over a period of many years. Furthermore, a jury
can occasionally produce fairer results if it knows the effect
of its verdict, as is shown by jury refusal to find contributory
negligence. 55 If the jury knows the law, it can use its "common
sense wisdom" to apply that law fairly in an individual case.
If the jury is ignorant of the law, this advantage is lost.
Jurors have many sources of information and can be ex-
pected to have some opinions about the effect of their verdict.
In some jurisdictions, counsel are permitted to argue for desig-
nated answers to special verdicts. The effect of the verdict or
Anderson v. Seelow, 224 Wis. 230, 234, 271 N.W. 844, 846 (1937) (empha-
sis added).
50. See Lyon v. City of Grand Rapids, 121 Wis. 609, 99 N.W. 311
(1904).
51. See, e.g., Timins v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 72 Iowa 94, 33 N.W.
379 (1887).
52. Lyon v. City of Grand Rapids, 121 Wis. 609, 99 N.W. 311 (1904).
53. See, e.g., Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 271 S.W.2d 85 (1954);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964); Montgomery v. Gay, 212 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
54. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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at least parts of it may be inferred from this sort of argument.
In addition, individual jurors may have gained knowledge of the
law through such means as personal experience, conversations,
newspaper reports of the results of cases and service on another
jury. If information gained in these ways is accurate, there is
no harm in telling the jury what it already knows. If such
information is inaccurate, however, the jurors' false assumptions
may destroy the justice of the verdict. An important example
of the danger of inaccurate jury information lies in the area
of comparative negligence. Under some comparative negligence
statutes, a verdict finding the plaintiff 50 percent negligent and
the defendant 50 percent negligent means that the plaintiff re-
covers nothing. If the jury returns a 50-50 verdict on the as-
sumption that plaintiff will recover 50 percent of the damages,
the jurors will be quite surprised at the result. Proponents of
the no information rule might argue that the jury is instructed
not to speculate on the result and should not do so. However,
the fact remains that juries will speculate. This would seem to
be especially true if one assumes that juries are "prejudiced"
and will try to manipulate the result. If the speculation is erro-
neous, it is the parties that suffer injustice, not the j urors.5 6
As a further criticism of the prevailing rule, both the charge
under the special verdict and the general charge may result in
confusion and error. At the beginning of a case, the jury prob-
ably has some ideas on the effect of its verdict. Counsel's re-
marks and possibly objections, and the judge's cautionary in-
structions are added to these preconceptions. The result is a
necessarily incomplete and confusing picture of the applicable
law which the prevailing rule adamantly refuses to correct by
providing the necessary information. Finally, the judge may
grant a directed verdict or a new trial if jury prejudice or ig-
norance is contrary to law or to the great weight of the evi-
dence.57 If the case is so close on -the facts and the law that
these devices are not available, the jury's "common sense wis-
dom" is just as reliable as any other method of selecting the
proper result.
56. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. For example, Min-
nesota will not permit the verdict to be impeached because the jury
misconceived the effect of its verdict. See Gardner v. Germain, 264
Minn. 61, 117 N.W.2d 759 (1962); Fortier v. Newman, 248 Minn. 69, 78
N.W.2d 382 (1956); Bauer v. Kummer, 244 Minn. 488, 70 N.W.2d 273
(1955).
57. See Fm,. R. Civ. P. 50, 59 and Alum. R. Civ. P. 50, 59.
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3. Alternatives to the Prevailing Rule
Providing the jury with complete information on the effect
of the verdict would meet the criticisms just discussed. The
jury's function of mitigating the law in individual cases would
be preserved and jury confusion would be at least partially elim-
inated. In addition, the value of the special verdict as an aid
to factfinding would not be reduced since the jury would still
have the questions to guide its decision.
An intermediate position is also possible. If a case involves
doubtful questions of law, giving the jury information on the
effect of the verdict could be held erroneous on appeal. This
would probably make a second trial of the case necessary. If
information could be withheld in such cases, the appellate court
could avoid a second trial by simply directing the entry of judg-
ment when the legal question was settled. It is this intermedi-
ate position of withholding information in some cases that Min-
nesota has taken.58
III. THE MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE
A. No INSTRUCTION ON THE EFFECT OF THE ANSWERS - THE Mc-
Courtie RULE
In McCourtie v. United States Steel Corp.,59 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that it was prejudicial error for a trial
court to instruct the jury on the effect of its answers to the
special verdict questions.60 In ordering a new trial, the court
commented that a trial court could not inform the jury either
expressly or by necessary implication of the effect of its an-
swers.61 The court took the view that the special verdict was
a necessary control on jury prejudice.62 It noted: "The control-
ling thought behind the special verdict 'is to free the jury from
any procedure which would inject the feeling of partisanship
58. For an article reaching this same conclusion, see Wright, The
Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.R.D. 199 (1966).
59. 253 Minn. 501, 93 N.W.2d 552 (1958). See also Comment, 43
MINN. L. REv. 823 (1959).
60. 253 Minn. at 515, 93 N.W.2d at 562.
61. Id. at 516, 93 N.W.2d at 562. Although he wrote the majority
opinion, Justice Murphy observed that counsel could argue to the jury
for favorable answers to particular questions. From this he concluded
that the jury already knew the effect of its answers. Id. at 517, 93
N.W.2d at 563.
62. See text accompanying notes 16-28 supra. The court cited
Judge Nordbye's article, supra note 28, 253 Minn. at 516, 93 N.W.2d at
562.
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in their minds, and limit the deliberations to the specific fact
questions submitted&"' 63 This purpose, the court reasoned, could
not be accomplished if the jury was told of the effect of its
answers. In support of its holding of prejudicial error, the court
noted as evidence of jury prejudice in the particular case that
excessive damages had been awarded.0 4
B. No AGUmEvNT oN THE EFFEcT OF ANSWERS - THE Johnson AND
Patterson RuLE
In Johnson v. O'Brien,65 plaintiff's counsel remarked to the
jury that "if the answers to Number 3 and Number 4 were to be
answered in any other way, then the burden would be shifted
from the shoulders of Mr. and Mrs. O'Brien to the shoulders
of Mrs. Elletson."66 The trial court ordered counsel to refrain
from such argument and cautioned the jury not to speculate
on the effect of the verdict. Defendant's motion for a mistrial
was denied by the trial court and the supreme court affirmed,
concluding that the cautionary instruction made the error non-
prejudicial.6 7 The supreme court also noted that the evidence
sustained the findings of the jury. 8 Justice Knutson and Chief
Justice Dell dissented. Justice Knutson argued: "it is equally
devastating to'permit counsel for a plaintiff to argue to the jury
that which we have held the court may not do. Here, again,
I think the error was prejudicial and that it requires a new
tria."69
In Patterson -v. Donahue,70 plaintiff's counsel indicated to
the jury that a finding of contributory negligence would reduce
plaintiff's damages. The trial court found no prejudicial error
and the supreme court affirmed, commenting:
References to the legal effect of a verdict by counsel during
oral argument are improper. Whether or not such improper ar-
gument constitutes grounds for a new trial is a matter resting
almost wholly in the discretion of the trial court. [Citing Jan-
gula v. Kiocek, 284 Minn. 477, 483, 170 N.W. 2d 578, 591 (1969).]
63. Id. at 517, 93 N.W.2d at 563. Justice Knutson concurred.
Id. at 518, 93 N.W.2d at 564. He admitted that under Rule 49.01, use
of a special verdict was discretionary with the trial court, but he argued
that a special verdict should be used properly if it is to be used at
all. Id. at 519, 93 N.W.2d at 564.
64. Id. at 518, 93 N.W.2d at 563.
65. 258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244 (1960).
66. Id. at 508, 105 N.W.2d at 248.
67. Id. at 509, 105 N.W.2d at 248.
68. Id., 105 N.W.2d at 248-49.
69. Id. at 513, 105 N.W.2d at 251.
70. 291Minn. 285,190 N.W.2d 864 (1971).
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In this case, where the issue of negligence of the parties is fairly
clear, the trial court was not obligated to grant a new trial
because of counsel's remark that a finding of negligence on the
part of the plaintiff would reduce his damages. 1
C. COMPLETE INSTRUCTION AND ARGUMENT - THE LEGISLATURE
ACTS
In 1971, the Minnesota Legislature attempted to provide the
jury with complete information on the effect of its answers
by amending MINNESOTA STATUTES § 546.14 to read:
Before the argument begins either party may submit to the
court written instructions to the jury, opposite each of which
the judge shall write the words, "Given," "Given as modified,"
or "Refused"; and the court, in its discretion, may hear argu-
ments before acting on such requests. The court of its own
motion may, and, upon request of either party, shall, lay before
the parties before the commencement of the argument any in-
structions which it will give in its charge, and all such instruc-
tions may be read to the jury by either party as a part of his
argument. The court shall give to the jury such explanations
and instructions concerning the matters thus submitted as may
be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each
issue, and the court shall explain to the jury the legal conclu-
sions which will follow from its findings, and counsel shall have
the right to comment thereon. At the close of the argument
the court may give, with the instructions so approved, such
other instructions as may be necessary fully to present the
law of the case.7 2
Although the amendment reversed the holdings of the supreme
court by requiring instruction and permitting argument on the
effect of the special verdict, the question remained unsettled.
Two objections to the validity of the amendment were raised.
First, section 546.14 had been declared superseded on January 1,
1952, when the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted
by the supreme court." If the statute was not in existence at the
time of the amendment, it could not be amended. Second, the
amendment changed a rule of procedure. Since the supreme
71. Id. at 287-88, 190 N.W.2d at 866 (footnotes omitted).
72. MINN. STAT. § 546.14 (1971) (1971 amendment emphasized).
73. MAUN. R. Civ. P. 81.01(3) provides that:
[T]he statutes listed in Appendix B and all other statutes in-
consistent or in conflict with these rules are superseded insofar
as they apply to pleading, practice and procedure in the district
court.
In 1971, Appendix B of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure read
in part:
Rule Statute Superseded M.S.A. 1949
51 546.14
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court had constitutional and inherent power to regulate proce-
dure, the legislature had encroached upon the court's domain.74
As a result, Minnesota practice was thrown into confusion. The
trial courts had been given contradictory orders. The supreme
court had ruled that informing the jury of the effect of its
answers was error. The legislature had dictated that the jury
be informed, but the validity of its action had been questioned.
Adding to the confusion, the supreme court questioned the va-
lidity of the act in dicta but did not rule on it.75
D. LumT INSTRUCTION AND ARGUMET-THE SuPRamE COURT
REsPoNDs
The supreme court responded to the legislature by amending
Rule 49.01 as follows:
(1) The court may require a jury to return only a special ver-
dict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue
of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written
questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or
may submit written forms of the several special findings which
might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or
it may use such other method of submitting the issues and re-
quire written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate.
The court shall give to the jury such explanations and instruc-
tions concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary
to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If
in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to
a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury
retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue
omitted without such demand, the court may make a finding;
or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding
in accord with the judgment on the special verdict. Except as
provided in Rule 49.01(2), neither the court nor counsel shall
inform the jury of the effect of its answers on the outcome of
the case.
(2) In actions involving Minn. Stat. 1971, Sec. 604.01, the court
shall inform the jury of the effect of its answers to the per-
centage of negligence question and shall permit counsel to com-
ment thereon, unless the court is of the opinion that doubtful
74. See note 95 infra.
75. In Patterson v. Donahue, 291 Minn. 285, 190 N.W.2d 864 (1971),
the court did not rule on the validity of the amendment because the
case had been tried before it became effective. The court did note, how-
ever:
This case was decided in the court below before the enactment
of L. 1971, c. 715, which purports to amend Minn. St. 1969,
§ 546.14, although by statutory authority this provision was su-
perseded as of January 1, 1952, by promulgation by this court
of Rule 51, Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 287-88 n.1, 190 N.W.2d at 866 n.1.
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or unresolved questions of law, or complex issues of law or
fact are involved, which may render such instruction or com-
ment erroneous, misleading or confusing to the jury.7 o
By providing for instruction and argument only in comparative
negligence cases, the court's rule clearly contradicts the statute
which makes instruction mandatory and argument permissible
in all cases.77 Even in comparative negligence cases, the rule
permits trial courts to decline to instruct or permit argument
when they believe that such instruction or argument would mis-
lead or confuse the jury.7 8 In addition to amending Rule 49.01,
the supreme court also included section, 546.14 in the list of
superseded statutes in Appendix B of the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure.7 9 In promulgating its own rule on the subject
of special verdict instructioh and argument, the court had thus
simultaneously declared the statutory amendment which con-
flicted with the rule "superseded."
On January 12, 1973, the supreme court decided another case
involving the problem of special verdict argument and instruc-
tion. In Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc.,8 0 the trial
court had decided to follow the amendment to section 546.14
and instruct the jury on the effect of its answers while per-
mitting counsel to argue the effect. The defendant appealed ar-
guing that the amendment was invalid.8 ' The supreme court
affirmed but elected not to consider the validity of the statutory
amendment.8 2 The court reasoned that such consideration was
unnecessary since the recent amendment to Rule 49.01 permitted
instruction and argument in the Krengel case (a comparative
negligence case). It would have been fruitless to remand the
case for retrial when the new rule would permit the same pro-
cedure to be used.88 The court, therefore, chose to apply its
own rule rather than the statutory amendment. It also refused
to comment on the validity of the statute even though it had
declared the statute superseded just seven days earlier.8 4
76. MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01 (amendment emphasized).
77. Mm-. STAT. § 546.14 (1971). See text accompanying note 72
supra.
78. MINN. R. Crv. P. 49.01(2). See text accompanying note 76
supra.
79. For the text prior to amendment see note 73 supra.
80. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973).
81. Brief for Appellant at 20-24.
82. 295 Minn. at 210-11, 203 N.W.2d at 847-48.
83. Id. at 211, 203 N.W.2d at 848.
84. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NEW RULE 49.01
The supreiie court's amendment of Rule 49.01 raises two sets
of problems. First, the amendment conflicts with a 1971 proce-
dural statute. This raises serious questions about the relative
powers of the legislature and the supreme court in the area of
trail court procedure. Second, the amendment contains ambig-
uities of policy and language which makes its application uncer-
taim
A. AUTHOR=TY OF THE SUPREVIE COURT TO SUPERSEDE A PROCEDURAL
STATUTE
The supreme court's authority to supersede section 546.14 will
be examined both in terms of statutory delegation of authority
to the court and in terms of the court's constitutional and in-
herent powers.
1. Statutory Authority
In 1947, the legislature gave the supreme court authority
to regulate pleading, -practice and procedure in all Minnesota
courts. mINNESOTA STATUTES § 480.051 provides:
The supreme court of this state shall have the power to regu-
late the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof
in civil actions in all courts of this state, other than the probate
courts, by rules promulgated by it from time to time. Such
rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights
of any litigant.8 5
To implement this authority, the supreme court was allowed to
supersede then existing procedural statutes by adopting court
rules. MINNESOTA STATUTES § 480.056 provides:
All present laws relating to pleading, practice, and procedure
... shall be effective as rules of court until modified or super-
seded by subsequent court rule, and upon the adoption of any
rule pursuant to this act such laws, in so far as they are in
conflict therewith, shall thereafter be of no further force and
effect.8 6
85. mx. STAT. § 480.051 (1971).
86. M iu. STAT. § 480.056 (1971) (emphasis added). According to
a well established principle of statutory construction, the term "such
laws" in the statute refers to its antecedent "present laws." Therefore,
it was "present laws" (i.e., laws existing in 1947) that the legislature
intended should be of no further force or effect upon the adoption of
rules of procedure. See State v. End, 232 Minn. 266, 45 N.W.2d 378
(1950). See also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Main, 240 Ore. 533, 402
P.2d 746 (1965); Sharlin v. Neighborhood Theatre, Inc., 209 Va. 718, 167
S .2d 334 (1969).
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Pursuant to these statutes, the supreme court enacted the Min-
nesota Rules of Civil Procedure and listed superseded statutes
in Appendix B of the rules. The court subsequently ruled that
this original list was not exclusive and has since added statutes
to it. s7
However, there are definite limitations on the court's au-
thority to enact rules and supersede statutes. Section 480.056
allows the court to supersede present laws, i.e., laws in existence
when that statute was enacted in 1947. It provides no author-
ity to supersede subsequently enacted laws. Furthermore, the
legislature specifically retained the authority to enact subse-
quent laws and repeal supreme court rules. Section 480.058 pro-
vides:
Sections 480.051 to 480.058 shall not abridge the right of the
legislature to enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify
or repeal any rule of the supreme court pursuant thereto.8 8
In view of these limitations, the court had no statutory authority
to supersede amended section 546.14 and replace it with its own
amendment to Rule 49.01. The statute was not a "present law"
in 1947 but rather was a 1971 law designed to reverse the Mc-
Courtie rule. It was an enactment of a statute in the sense
intended by section 480.058.
In Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc.,0 the appel-
lant argued that section 546.14 was not a "statute" in the sense
intended by section 480.058 and could not be validly amended
since it was already on the court's superseded list when the leg-
islature enacted the 1971 amendment. 0 It is clear that the 1971
statute was an attempt to amend a statute which had been su-
perseded. However, such a technical deficiency should not be
allowed to thwart the obvious intent of the legislature. The
1971 statute is unambiguous on its face and can validly be
treated as a distinct statute providing that:
87. See State v. Robnan, 259 Minn. 88, 90, 107 N.W.2d 51, 53 (1960).
88. MiNN. STAT. § 480.058 (1971) (emphasis added).
89. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973).
90. Brief for Appellant at 19-20. The appellant also argued that
the statute violated article 6, section 27 of the Minnesota Constitution
which provides that "[n]o law shall embrace more than one subject,
which shall be expressed in its title." The appellant contended that
MINN. STAT. § 546.14 was entitled "Requested Instructions" and there-
fore that Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 715 (the amendment) unconstitutionally
expanded its coverage. Brief for Appellant at 21-22. The respondent
replied that Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 715 embraced a single general subject
-courts, trials, and jury instruction and argument-and was constitu-
tional. Brief for Respondent at 35-37. The court did not comment on
this argument.
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[T]he court shall explain to the jury the legal conclusions
which wfll follow from its findings, and counsel shall have the
right to comment thereon.9 1
Both the statutory and judicial rules of construction favor giving
the statute full effect. MINNESOTA STATUTES § 645.16, pro-
vides that the object of statutory construction "is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature" and that laws
should be construed "to give effect to all [their] provisions.1 2
The supreme court has held that the adoption of an amendment
raises a presumption that the legislature intended to change the
law.93 In addition, the court has upheld amendments to par-
tially invalid statutes.94 There is no basis for rebutting the pre-
sumption that the legislature intended to reverse the McCourtie
rule when it enacted the 1971 statute. Such a clear intention
should be given effect despite a technical error.
In summary, statutory authority for the supreme court's ac-
tions is not persuasive. Although the court was given au-
thority to enact rules and supersede statutes, the legislature re-
tained unabridged authority to enact and change both statutes
and court rules under section 480.058. By superseding the 1971
statute, the court improperly disregarded that authority.
2. Constitutional and Inherent Authority
Hetland and Adamson suggest the possibility that the court
can claim constitutional and/or inherent authority to super-
sede the statute.95 At present, the Minnesota Constitution does
not clearly indicate which branch of the state government has
the power to make trial court rules. The original constitution
provided: "Legal pleadings and proceedings in the courts of this
91. See the text accompanying note 72 supra.
92. MNw. STAT. § 645.16 (1971).
93. See Western Union TeL Co. v. Spaeth, 232 Minn. 128, 132, 44
N.W.2d 440, 442 (1950).
94. State ex rel. Grozbach v. Common School Dist. No. 65, 237
Minn. 150, 54 N.W.2d 130 (1952); State ex rel. Salten v. McDonald, 121
Minn. 207, 141 N.W. 110 (1913). For a complete analysis of the statu-
tory authority arguments, see Brief for Respondent at 28-41, Krengel
v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973).
95. HL-mAND & AimvsoN, supra note 39, at 11 (Supp. 1972). The
commentators note the confusion in trial courts following the adoption
of Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 715 and cite McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278
Minn. 32, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) as authority for the use of the court's
inherent power to remedy the situation. It should be noted, however,
that McCormack is distinguishable on two grounds: (1) that case dealt
with the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, and (2) the result
in that case was also supported by statutory authority.
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
state shall be under the direction of the legislature."D However,
this provision was deleted from the constitution in 1956. Al-
though constitutional study groups had recommended substitute
provisions giving the supreme court rulemaking authority,0 7
these provisions were not adopted. Events have therefore made
it unclear whether the legislature or the supreme court or both
have constitutional power to make trial court rules.08
Since early times, the Minnesota legislature has delegated
rulemaking authority to the supreme court.0 9 The court ac-
cepted this delegation and acknowledged that it had no inde-
pendent rulemaking authority. 100 In 1947, the legislature gave
the supreme court broad statutory authority over all court
rules. 1 1 Subsequently, the court again acknowledged that its
rulemaking authority was purely statutory:
At the outset we must bear in mind that the rules of civil pro-
cedure were adopted pursuant to authorization granted by the
legislature. L. 1947, c. 498. The enabling act itself prescribed
the limits beyond which we may not go. The title of the act
reads: "An act authorizing the supreme court to regulate by
rules the pleading, practice, and procedure in civil cases in all
96. MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 14 (deleted 1956).
97. See Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article
of the Minnesota Constitution, 40 MINN. L. Rxv. 815 (1956) and Prelim-
inary Report on Revision of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota State
Constitution, 32 MiNN. L. REv. 458 (1948).
98. In 1956, Pirsig commented on the constitution which was then
before the voters in the following manner:
The proposed article does not expressly confer rule-making
power upon the supreme court. The present article provides
that "legal pleadings and proceedings in the courts of this State
shall be under the direction of the legislature." This is not re-
tained in the proposed article. It is probable that under this
provision of the present article legislation is authorized which
confers power upon courts to make rules of pleading, procedure
and evidence. On that assumption, the supreme court has been
given power to make rules of procedure in civil actions. The
question, however, is not beyond doubt, and the doubt may.be
increased by the omission of the quoted provision. A provision
such as appeared in the draft of the 1947 Constitutional Com-
mission would have been desirable.
Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minne-
sota Constitution, 40 MiNN. L. Rlv. 815, 820 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the wording of the Minnesota Constitution would support a
construction that the rulemaking power was legislative in nature and
could not properly be delegated to the supreme court. Clearly, such
a construction would be unreasonable. However, the fact that a leading
contemporary commentator felt the need to rebut this interpretation in-
dicates that there was no intent to give the supreme court exclusive
authority over rulemaking.
99. See Smith v. Valentine, 19 Minn. 452 (Gil. 393) (1873).
100. Id.
101. MINN. STAT. §§ 480.051-.058 (1971).
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the courts of this state." . . . It is obvious that our power un-
der this act is limited .... "1-02
In addition to consistently staying within statutory guide-
lines, the supreme court also upheld a significant legislative en-
actment requiring a jury instruction on the presumption of due
care of decedents. In TePoel v. Larson,10 3 the court held that
it was error to instruct the jury that a presumption of due care
existed. The legislature then enacted a statute which created
a presumption of due care, required that the jury be instructed
as to the existence of the presumption and provided that the
jury should determine whether the presumption was rebutted
by the evidence. 0 4  In Steinhaus v. Adamson,'°0 the court up-
held the statute which in essence required that the jury be in-
formed of the law. In superseding the 1971 statute requiring
instruction on the effect of answers to special verdict questions,
the court nullified a statute requiring essentially the same re-
sult.
Given this history of Minnesota practice, the deletion of
article 6, section 14 from the Minnesota Constitution was prob-
ably no more than the omission of surplusage. 0 0 The legislature
had delegated rulemaking authority to the supreme court and
the supreme court had remained within that authority. Both
parties had acquiesced in the power arrangement. This would
102. Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 550, 68 N.W.2d 649, 651
(1955) (emphasis added).
103. 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952).
104. Mnm. STAT. § 602.04 (1971).
105. 294 Minn. 387, 201 N.W.2d 264 (1972).
106. Pirsig commented on the proposed Judiciary Article as follows:
It is possible and feasible to leave most questions to legis-
lative decision in which event the provisions of the judicial ar-
ticle can be very brief and general. The United States Consti-
tution Article IM, consisting of but three short sections, is an
example. States, however, have not followed this example and
have tended to go into extensive detail, prescribing the various
courts, their jurisdiction, districts, etc. The more modem tend-
ency, exemplified by the 1945 New Jersey Constitution, is to-
ward more general provisions, leaving to the legislature and
courts the necessary detail. Details in the constitution not deal-
ing with fundamental principles and problems, make for an in-
flexible structure and invite litigation over the application of
the provisions.
The proposed judiciary article has moved in the direction
of the modern trend. There has been a simplification and clar-
ification of the article. But, as will be noted, in some respects
it fails to incorporate the best thought on modern court organ-
ization.
Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minne-
sota Constitution, 40 Mnmx. L. Rsv. 815, 817 (1956).
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also explain why substitute provisions for supreme court author-
ity were never enacted.
The lack of a specific constitutional provision on the making
of rules for trial courts raises a further question based upon
the separation of powers. It is possible that rulemaking is so
inherently a judicial function that invasion by the legislature
is improper. The Minnesota constitution formulates the separa-
tion of powers in the following manner:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments-legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person
or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either
of the others, except in instances provided in this constitu-
tion.1O7
The problem with such a formulation is that there is no way
to determine which governmental functions are properly con-
sidered executive, legislative and judicial.
The supreme court has assumed broad power to define ju-
dicial functions.' 08 In In Re Greathouse,0 9 the court com-
mented:
The judicial power of this court had its origin in the constitu-
tion; but when the court came into existence it came with in-
herent powers. Such power is the right to protect itself, to en-
able it to administer justice whether any previous form of rem-
edy has been granted or not. This same power authorizes the
making of rules of practice.110
Although this dictum authorizes a broad range of inherent pow-
ers, the relationship between the judicial exercise of inherent
powers and the legislative power is confusing. At that time
(1933), the legislature rather than the court possessed constitu-
tional authority to make rules of practice. Likewise, the power
of a court to create new remedies could not imply a lack of
such power in the legislature. Therefore, it appears that this
concept of inherent powers could grant no more than author-
ity concurrent with that of the legislature.
Regulation of the practice of law is the only area in which
the court has consistently asserted exclusive authority. The the-
oretical basis for this position is that in order to preserve itself,
the court must regulate the quality of the bar practicing before
it."' In this area, the court has struck down statutes regulating
107. imIN. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (emphasis added).
108. Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973).
109. 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933).
110. Id. at 55, 248 N.W. at 737 (emphasis added).
111. In re Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn.
195, 199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943).
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disbarment," 2 the disposition of bar fees" 3 and the general prac-
tice of law.114 Other state courts have also claimed inherent
powers in these areas.1 5
.Courts in other jurisdictions have suggested various tests
to determine the validity of procedural legislation. One court
has held that the legislature cannot control the procedure of
constitutionally created courts."" Other courts have held that
procedural statutes must be upheld unless they violate substan-
tive rights or hamper courts in the performance of their du-
ties.117 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has ob-
served that Congress clearly has the power to enact rules of
civil procedure for the federal trial courts."18
Application of these tests to the supreme court's action in
superseding the 1971 statute produces no clear result. The dis-
trict and probate courts are mentioned in. the Minnesota Con-
stitution," 9 but neither the legislature nor the supreme court
is given authority over their internal procedures. The 1971 stat-
ute places no undue burden on the trial court's function-it
merely requires instruction and permits argument on the effect
of the special verdict. While this will require preparing extra
instructions, it is hardly a significant impairment of the trial
court's functions.
In the face of ambiguous constitutional and inherent author-
ity, several additional considerations cast doubt on the supreme
court's action. First, the 1971 statute is more than a procedural
statute; it is bound up with a substantive right to jury trial.1-20
112. In re Disbarment of Tracey, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88 (1936).
113. Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973).
114. Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940). For
a complete discussion and citation of the pertinent authorities on inher-
ent power to regulath the practice of law in Minnesota, see Sharood
v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973).
115. See J. CAmGAi, ImE mu PowERs OF THE CouRTs (1973) for cita-
tions to cases on all aspects of inherent power. See also In re Integra-
tion of Nebraska State Bar, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937); State
ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d
643, 154 N.W.2d 250 (1968); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis.
2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1138 (1969); Annot.,
114 A.L.R. 151 (1938).
116. Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49 (1958).
117. Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky. 263, 118 S.W.2d 547 (1938). See also
Annot., 158 AI.R. 705 (1945) and Annot., 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937) and cases
cited therein.
118. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1949).
119. See MqmN. CONST. art. 6, § 1, which provides for a supreme
court, district courts, and probate courts.
120. To this extent, the problem is identical to that posed in Stein-
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The statute provides a trial by a jury that has been informed
of the effect of its answers to the special verdict questions. The
legislature apparently felt that an informed jury would behave
differently from an uninformed one. The 1971 statute repre-
sents a policy decision that the informed jury is superior. That
decision has the support of many distinguished commentators
who believe that the jury should be allowed to consider the ap-
plication of the law to the facts of a case.121 The statute there-
fore has a rational basis, contradicts no constitutional provision
and should not have been superseded. Second, the supreme
court has throughout its history acquiesced in the legislature's
authority to make trial court rules and has stayed within that
authority. The legislature relied on that acquiescence in enact-
ing the 1971 statute. The supreme court should not have at-
tempted to construct a new theory of power by purporting to
supersede that statute. Finally, even if the supreme court could
make a persuasive argument for its authority to supersede the
statute, it has not done So. 1 22
B. THE AmEMDENT TO RULE 49.01
1. Policy Considerations Underlying the Amendment
The confusion in Minnesota trial courts regarding the valid-
ity of section 546.14 as amended was a major consideration in
amending Rule 49.01. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee,
which submitted the amendment, stated:
Your Advisory Committee remains firm in its opinion that such
an urgency exists to resolve the confusion and to clarify the
inconsistency in practice regarding the proper procedure to be
followed in submitting special verdicts to the jury following
the enactment of Laws 1971, Chapter 715, and following the re-
port of the Advisory Committee in June, 1972,128 as to require
haus v. Adamson, 294 Minn. 387, 201 N.W.2d 264 (1972). The majority
recognized that a substantive right was at stake in the presumption of
due care. Note, however, Todd, J., dissenting:
However, I would hold that the statute, Minn. St. 602.04, is in-
valid since the legislature has no constitutional power to pre-
scribe rules of evidence for the judicial branch of government.
294 Minn. at 397, 201 N.W.2d at 271.
121. See notes 30-32 supra.
122. See Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200,
203 N.W.2d 841 (1973), wherein the court specifically declined to com-
ment upon the issue.
123. In June, 1972, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee recom-
mended that the McCourtie rule be retained without change. The com-
mittee suggested an amendment which stated: "Neither the court or
counsel shall inform the jury of the effect of its answers on the out-
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immediate action by the Court. Your Advisory Committee...
recommends that the Court not delay adoption of the proposed
amendments to Rule 49.01 .... 124
However, a desire to eliminate trial court confusion does not
explain the content of the amendment. The supreme court
could have eliminated the confusion by adopting an amendment
-which accorded with the 1971 statute, but it chose to follow a
different course.
The amendment retains the McCourtie rule' 25 of no instruc-
tion or argument on the effect of the verdict in all non-com-
parative negligence cases. 126 Although this directly contradicts
the 1971 statute, the Advisory Committee gave no reason for
retaining the rule which, -as previously noted, had been subjected
to severe criticism. 27 The McCourtie rule does not consider the
role of the common sense wisdom of juries in mitigating unfair
laws and producing just results in individual cases.128  Rather,
it succeeds only in confusing juries and encouraging dangerous
jury speculation on the effect of the answers. Furthermore, it
is unnecessary in view of other controls on prejudiced juries.'20
The supreme court retained the McCourtie rule in its amend-
ment to Rule 49.01(1) without any response to this criticism.
The amendment modifies the McCourtie rule in comparative
negligence cases by permitting information concerning the effect
of the jury's answer to the percentage of negligence question
unless the trial judge decides that such information would be
erroneous or confusing. 30  In supporting this modification, the
Advisory Committee Comment noted that the court must use
a special verdict in comparative negligence cases but that it has
complete discretion as to verdict form in all other cases. 131 The
Comment then stated that special verdicts1 32 may not be the
come of the case." Comment of the Supreme Court Advisory Commit-
tee 1 (June 30, 1972).
124. Comment of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee 3 (De-
cember 20, 1972).
125. See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
126. Minx. R. Civ. P. 49.01 (1). See text accompanying note 76
supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
128. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
129. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
130. MnuN. R. Civ. P. 49.01(2). See text accompanying note 76
supra.
131. See Comment of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee at
3-4 (December 20, 1972). See also MImN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1971).
132. By "special verdict," the Committee apparently meant special
verdict without instruction or argument on the effect of the answers.
1074]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
best policy in all comparative negligence cases: "The special ver-
dict may be most desirable in a complex, multi-party, multi-
issue negligence action, but quite inappropriate in a simple two
or three party negligence action. ' 133 This conclusion was based
upon a belief that special verdicts could be used to avoid error
in complex cases.13 4
The Comment contemplated deferring doubtful or complex
questions of law until after the verdict is in. The trial judge
could then hear argument on the legal questions, decide them
and enter judgment accordingly. If the judge is reversed on
appeal, judgment could possibly be ordered without the neces-
sity of a second trial because the special verdict itself and the
instructions would still be error-free. If, on the other hand, the
judge or counsel informed the jury of the effect of the verdict
and the verdict was then reversed, a new trial would probably
be necessary since the jury would have been influenced by erro-
neous legal information. The Comment thus emphasized adminis-
trative reasons for withholding information. As a result, the Min-
nesota court has shifted its rationale for the no information rule
from a jury prejudice view 3 5 to a helpful trial aid view.130 In-
formation is not withheld because juries will manipulate it but
because new trials may be avoided in complex cases.
There are two difficulties with this policy. First, it removes
from the jury its valuable function of mitigating the law in
its application to actual cases.' 37 The importance of this func-
tion is not diminished merely because the case is complex. Sec-
ond, the administrative advantage is largely speculative. Many
types of error creep into complex cases-for example, errors
of instruction, evidence, form of the verdict and argument. The
jury still must be instructed on the law necessary to answer
the questions, even if that law is doubtful or complex. Thus,
avoiding errors on this one kind of jury information-the effect
of the verdict-may not prevent many retrials.
The comparative negligence statute' 38 may have been an ad-
ditional reason for the rule's special treatment of comparative
negligence. That statute requires the use of special verdicts and
133. See Comment of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee at
4 (December 20, 1972).
134. Id.
135. See text accompanying notes 16-28 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 38-48 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
138. MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1971).
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is used in a large percentage of civil cases. The statute also
denies all recovery to a plaintiff whose percentage of negligence
is equal to or greater than the defendant's. These aspects of
the law are probably a mystery to the average juror. Thus,
when a jury intends that the plaintiff receive some compensation
but returns a verdict finding plaintiff 50 percent negligent and
defendant 50 percent negligent, it will be quite surprised when
the court dismisses the action. On the other hand, if the jury
knows the effect of the 50-50 verdict (which is the answer to
the percentage of negligence question), it can avoid that verdict
in order to permit the plaintiff to recover some damages. Al-
though no legislative history for the 1971 statute is available,
it is probable that the legislature was aware of the problem of
the 50-50 verdict.139 If this assumption is correct, Rule 49.01(2)
can be interpreted as the supreme court's response to legislative
discontent with the administration of the comparative negligence
law.140
2. Practical Application of Amended Rule 49.01.
The operation of Rule 49.01(1) presents no new problems.
Since that portion of the rule preserves the McCourtie rule, it
will no doubt be construed in accord with McCourtie and the
line of cases -that followed it 1 41 Instructions and arguments
which inform the jury of the effect of its answers will continue
to constitute prejudicial error. The trial judge retains discretion
as to whether a special verdict is to be used.1 42
139. Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute was the source of
Minnesota's statute. See The Legislative Committee Comment on
MnNN. STAT. § 604.01 (1) at 38 M.S.A. at 143 (Supp. 1974). Wisconsin
has changed its statute to permit recovery on a 50-50 verdict, but it
still does not permit information to be given to the jury on the effect
of the answers. See Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1972) and Koblenski v. lil-
waukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 504, 202 N.W.2d 415
(1972).
140. In a further assault on the validity of Rule 49.01, Minnesota
Fourth District Judge Dana Nicholson has raised the possibility of con-
stitutional objections. He maintained that: (1) the different treatment
of comparative and noncomparative negligence cases under the rule vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution; and (2) the right to jury trial embodied
in the Minnesota Constitution includes the right to have the jury in-
formed of the effect of its answers. See Johnson v. Black, File No.
683912, Order Granting New Trial, at 5 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Dist., filed
February 14, 1974).
141. See text accompanying notes 59-71 supra.
142. Mnw. IL Civ. P. 49.01(1). See text accompanying note 76
supTa.
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The operation of Rule 49.01(2) presents two construction
problems. First, the rule allows the trial court to refuse to in-
form the jury of the effect but does not suggest a standard for
reviewing the trial court's exercise of that discretion. The
standard could vary from virtually complete to quite limited dis-
cretion in determining when issues are doubtful or complex and
when information is misleading or erroneous. The Advisory
Committee Comment provides little help in ascertaining the ap-
propriate standard of review. It merely suggests that cases of
withholding information will be "unusual" and that the trial
court's discretion will be "reviewable." 343
The language of the rule places broad discretion in the
hands of trial judges. Information is withheld not merely when
it would be erroneous or misleading but also when the trial
court is of the opinion that it could be erroneous or misleading.
The language of the statute suggests two sets of questions
which trial judges should ask in determining whether to with-
hold information: (1) Are doubtful questions of law involved?
Would information on the percentage of negligence involve spec-
ulation on a legal issue of first impression? The reference point
for this set of questions is the supreme court. If information
on the effect of the answers is likely to be held erroneous on
appeal, it can be properly withheld. (2) Is the case complex?
How many parties, claims, and issues are involved? Do the in-
dividual issues involve simple or complicated rules of law? The
point of reference for this set of questions is the jury. If infor-
mation is likely to confuse or mislead the jury, it can also be
properly withheld. If either series of questions can be answered
"yes" the trial court has a reason to avoid informing the jury
of the effect of its answers.
Second, the term "percentage of negligence question"' 4' may
cause construction problems. In a simple comparative negli-
gence case, the jury might be asked:
1. Was defendant negligent?
2. Was defendant's negligence a cause of plaintiff's injury?
3. Was plaintiff negligent?
4. Was plaintiff's negligence a cause of plaintiff's injury?
5. Indicate in percentages the negligence attributable to
each party. Plaintiff . Defendant
143. See Comment of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee at
4 (December 20, 1972).
144. Alum. R. Cri. P. 49.01(2).
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6. Did plaintiff assume the risk that caused his injury?'45
7. What was the amount of plaintiff's damages?
In this case, the jury would be informed of the effect of its
answers to question number 5 only. Under the comparative neg-
ligence statute, this would involve telling the jury: (1) that
plaintiff can recover only if his percentage of negligence is less
than defendant's percentage; and (2) that plaintiff's damages
will be reduced in proportion to plaintiff's percentage of negli-
gence. The jury would not be told: (1) that it must find negli-
gence and cause on the part of both parties before question num-
ber 5 is even relevant; and (2) that an affirmative answer to
question number 6 on assumption of risk will bar all recovery
regardless of the other answers. Thus, unless the supreme court
changes the rule or expands the definition of "percentage of neg-
ligence question," the jury will still not be informed of crucial
matters regarding the verdict. While the supreme court might
allow the information concerning the relevance of question num-
ber 5 since it is necessary before the percentage question can
be answered, it cannot permit information relating to the other
special verdict questions without violating its own rule. This
problem promises to be a subject of future litigation.'"4
V. CONCLUSION
The new Rule 49.01 has complicated and confused Minnesota
special verdict procedure. Rule 49.01(1) preserves the Mc-
Courtie no-information-on-the-effect-of-the-verdict-rule in the
face of severe policy criticism as to its necessity and desirability.
Rule 49.01(2) abolishes McCourtie in comparative negligence
cases, but its ambiguity in limiting the jury to information re-
garding the effect of the percentage of negligence question and
in allowing judges to refuse information in complex cases invites
fruitless appellate litigation. Furthermore, the rule was enacted
by superseding a valid statute and encroaching on legislative
power to make a policy decision.
Straightening out this unfortunate development in special
verdict procedure is in the first instance the job of the supreme
145. Minnesota prospectively abolished the separate defense of im-
plied assumption of risk in Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192
N.W.2d 826 (1971). However, this problem will still be present when-
ever a special verdict question other than the comparative negligence
question might conceivably bar recovery.
146. See Johnson v. Black, File No. 683912, Order Granting New
Trial at 2-4 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Dist., filed February 14, 1974).
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court. The court should amend Rule 49.01 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure again, this time using the exact word-
ing of the 1971 amendment to section 546.14. This would elimi-
nate conflicting authority and return the court to its proper role
in rule enactment. If the court fails to take this action the legis-
lature should regard this situation as a covert attempt to expand
"inherent power" and thwart legislative intent in an important
area of public policy. To deal with this situation, the legislature
should enact a special statute which repeals the Rule 49.01
amendments and reinstates the 1971 statute.
The Minnesota experience with the problem of informing
the jury of the effect of its answers to special verdict ques-
tions has important implications for other jurisdictions using
the special verdict. First, it should give those jurisdictions an
opportunity to consider the role of the jury in civil litigation.
One of the greatest problems in assessing the policies underlying
what information is given to juries about special verdicts is the
lack of reliable data on how juries behave in civil litigation. A
careful and scientific study of the results of Minnesota's depar-
ture from a policy of no instruction or argument thereon should
be instructive to those jurisdictions. Second, the history of the
change in the Minnesota rule should provide some insight into
the proper roles of the courts and the legislature in working
toward procedural reform.
[Vol. 58:903
